Essentially, Saudi is promoting the idea that terrorism is a viable path to political change, and that won't necessarily sit well when the chickens eventually come home to roost. 4)

Hezbollah can now be seen as a partner to Iran rather than a proxy for its national government due to the simple fact that the Iranian government has little or no direct control over the day-to-day activities of Hezbollah, leaving the organization largely independent and focused far more on domestic Lebanese concerns rather than on issue more important to Iran.

5)

Byman suggests that rather than simply labeling states with a "rogue state" status, true regime and political change is necessary in countries that pose this threat. He also asserts that this has "little to do with Washington," however, and thus is not advocating direct military action by the U.S. Or other nations/international entities to bring about this change.

6)

Metz sees the "new" state sponsored terrorism as terrorism sponsored against external enemies, and the three goals he identifies for such terrorism are to undermine the other regime's support, to break the morale of its elites, or to change a particular policy of the regime.

7)

A primary advantage that is noted in the use of state-sponsored terrorism rather than the use of conventional military forces is the cost effectiveness of such a strategy, as it avoids the cost of outfitting and paying a conventional military force as a trade off for true control.

8)

Disbanding a terrorist organization, Metz notes, is often more difficult than starting one, as such organizations typically develop enough internal structure and drive to continue their operations without the need for the original state sponsor for resources or objectives.

Dispersal, on the other hand, makes the force weaker at all points and thus less effective overall.
15)

Causing fear that disrupts the political and social cohesion of the society and disrupting resources and supplies.